Drill · coercion
Coercion / duress PIN
Procedure taughtSet the duress PIN correctly (Settings → Security → Device unlock → Duress password) — and understand when it helps and when it hurts.
The duress PIN is powerful and irreversible. This drill reproduces pitfall #1 from the hardening sheet, then asks the hard question honestly: should you really use it?
Start here
You are setting the duress PIN. Which value do you choose?
Settings → Security → Device unlock → Duress password.
The same as my real code (easier to remember)Pitfall
ConsequencePitfall #1. A duress PIN identical to the real code wipes NOTHING — it simply unlocks. The device rightly refuses a duress equal to the real code. It must differ, or the protection does not exist.
SourcesGrapheneOS — Duress password
A distinct code, memorised separatelyGood move
ConsequenceCorrect. Entered in place of the real code, it triggers an immediate, irreversible wipe. Pick one you can recall under stress but cannot type by accident.
SourcesGrapheneOS — Duress password
You are coerced to unlock. Do you use the duress PIN?
There is no universal right answer. The point is to decide calmly, not in panic.
Yes — I wipe everythingNuance
ConsequenceThis protects your data and contacts, but it is final: no recovery. And in some legal settings, destroying evidence during an inspection is a separate offence. Reserve it for threats where a data leak is worse than anything else.
No — the data on board doesn’t justify itGood move
ConsequenceOften the right instinct if the device holds little. The best defense is still not to carry what is irreplaceable: separate account, encrypted offline backup. Duress is a last resort, not a routine.
What this drill proves
The duress PIN is only worth anything if it differs from the real code — and using it is a heavy trade-off, not a reflex. onsecret sets it up with you and explains the consequences; the decision to use it stays yours.
- A duress wipe is immediate and TOTALLY irreversible: no last-minute backup.
- Destroying data under coercion may be an offence depending on jurisdiction.
- Duress does not protect an already-unlocked device, nor anything already copied.
- This is not legal advice.
Sources: GrapheneOS — Duress password · EFF — Digital privacy at the U.S. border